I. INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the Arkansas General Assembly allowed people to take guns into places of worship.' Representatives of religious congregations offered differing testimony on the need for the bill.' Some legislators were concerned that a categorical prohibition violated religious liberty. 3 1. Act of Feb. 11, 2013 , Act 67, § 1, 2013 Ark. Acts 273, 274 (codified as amended at ARK. CODE (Supp. 2013) ). Prior law categorically exempted churches. (1997) . The new statute continues this categorical exemption but "does not preclude a church or other place of worship from determining who may carry a concealed handgun into the church or other place of worship. (B) (Supp. 2013) . This issue came up in the 2011 legislative session during which I was asked for my opinion on the free exercise implications of the former categorical exemption for churches. See Lee Hogan, Beebe Signs Guns in Church Bill into Law, ARK. ONLINE (Feb. 11, 2013, 1:26 PM) , http://ww w.arkansasonline.com/news/2013/feb/11/gov-beebe-signs-guns-church-bill-law/, archived at htt p://perma.cc/B2MW-7BH4.
2. See Sean Beherec, Michael R. Wickline & Sarah D. Wire, Church Leaders Give Views on Guns in Sanctuaries, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Feb. 1, 2013, at 8A. 3. See Letter from Dustin McDaniel, Attorney Gen., to Beverly Pyle, Ark. State Legislature Representative (Sept. 29, 2009 ). Representative Pyle, the requestor, also asked for my opinion. See letter on file with author. The legislation included an "Emergency Clause" declaring that personal security is increasingly important; that the Second Amendment of the Constitution of the United States ensures a person's right to bear arms; and that this act is immediately necessary because a person should be allowed to carry a firearm in a church that permits the carrying of a firearm for personal security. Act 67, § 2, 2013 Ark. Acts at 274. So-called "emergency clauses" are routinely added to legislation to allow laws to go into effect immediately. Opponents of the change offered This argument was similar to the one made by Georgia churches that sued the state over its categorical prohibition on guns in churches.' On the other hand, Minnesota churches sued the state when that state changed the law to allow guns in houses of worship. 5 This correlation of guns and religion raises a number of interesting, non-trivial questions about the application of First Amendment law and the nature of religious liberty. This Article will explore some of those questions. 6 
II. BASIC GUN CONTROL MEASURES AND HOUSES OF WORSHIP
Gun control measures revolve around two basic issues: who should be allowed to carry a gun and where those guns should be allowed to be carried. 7 The first focuses on how easy it should be to carry guns and who should be allowed to carry them. 8 The second focuses on where those guns should be allowed.' [98:1103 One rationale is that although carrying weapons in public may be helpful for individual self-defense, that justification breaks down in large public gatherings.'° Most people will be unarmed and crowded into a confined space. Even one person with a gun may cause considerable injury before being stopped. Moreover, an exchange of gunfire between the "good guys" and the "bad guys" may be just as dangerous as a lone gunman. 11 Another rationale is that some places are incompatible with weapons. Schools, courthouses, government buildings, and legislative chambers are places where either vulnerable populations are housed (like schools) or where public business is conducted. The use or threat of force is incompatible with this property's function. Finally, some "sensitive places" provide security by screening people who enter, thus obviating the need for an individual to be armed for self-defense. 2 Houses of worship share some but not all of the characteristics of each of these categories. 13 (reporting that all fifty states now have provisions for concealed carrying of weapons REV. 637, 670-708 (2006) (listing 35 states in the Appendix as "shall-issue" states). Embedded into these processes is the question of who, if anyone, should not be allowed to carry a gun. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2012) (prohibiting the sale or disposition of firearms to felons, fugitives, illegal aliens, and domestic violence offenders, among others); id. § 922(x)(2) (prohibiting juveniles from possessing a handgun or handgun ammunition).
9. Volokh, supra note 6, at 1515 ("Many laws prohibit most people from possessing guns in certain places, such as on all public streets, in bars, in parks, and in public housing projects.").
10. See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2009 ), vacated on other grounds, 611 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding ban on possession of firearms in "open air" places "because possessing firearms in such places risks harm to great numbers of defenseless people (e.g., children)").
11. See Nordyke, 563 F.3d at 459 (ruling against open carry and, for that matter, carry laws). The Supreme Court recently declined to hear three cases challenging gun laws, giving rise to the inference that states may proscribe gun possession in certain places. Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court Declines Challenges to Gun Laws, REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2014, 10 :00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/24/us-usa-court-guns-idUSBREA1Nl28214022 4, archived at http://perma.cc/KD3A-9TJM.
12. Brian C. Whitman, In Defense of Self-Defense: Heller's Second Amendment in Sensitive Places, 81 MISS. L.J. 1987 , 1989 -90 (2012 .
13. Id. at 2007-08 (calling gun bans in houses of worship an "obvious violation" of the Second Amendment). Colleges and universities are often included in these lists, too. Id. at 2006-07. The constitutionality of gun bans on campus is fiercely contested. Compare Joan H. Miller, Comment, The Second Amendment Goes to College, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 235 (2011) (arguing that broad gun bans are constitutional), with Brian Miller, Legal Experts: Campus Gun Bans Flawed, Unconstitutional, COLLEGE FIX (Jan. 14, 2013) , http://www.thecol Other states permit holders to carry guns anywhere but allow property owners to ban weapons on their property by posting notices or using other methods to notify permit holders. 4 In opt-out jurisdictions, permit holders can carry guns into houses of worship unless the organization posts notices declaring its property a gun-free zone. 5 Churches and other houses of worship have argued that requiring them to post opt-out notices violated their religious beliefs in peace and in offering worshipers a safe and inclusive sanctuary. 6 In the categorical jurisdictions, churches have argued that the total ban violates their religious freedom. 7 They believe that it is "right and just" for their members to attend services armed and the state cannot interfere with this belief and action. 18 These claims raise questions about the nature of religious freedom in today's world as well as the adequacy of current First Amendment law." One might be suspicious of claims that "God requires us to bring our weapons to church," but claiming a divine command to be armed is not unprecedented°. (West 2011) . 1 will refer to these states, collectively, as "opt-out jurisdictions."
15. See Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. Minnesota, 745 N.W.2d 194, 202 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008 ). 16. Id. at 199-202. 17. See GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244 , 1255 (11th Cir. 2012 Christians, on the other hand, must infer such a duty. 22 The result could be a corruption of religion with the latest political cause. 23 At the same time, this very suspicion should make us wary. It is an enduring problem of free exercise law that we will tolerate the religious claims that seem most reasonable because they seem "normal." 2 4
Current First Amendment law cannot coherently address these different situations. In the categorical jurisdictions, the claims will founder on whether or not the law actually burdens a religious belief because the religious claim collapses into the secular preference to be armed. Yet the categorical exclusion of places of worship singles them out for exceptional treatment and includes them with other areas that may have little in common with places of worship. 6 In the opt-out jurisdictions, the claim will founder because, although it may be easier for a court to see a religious burden, the laws will be neutral and generally applicable. 27 They do not single out religion. Rather, they allow churches to opt out by following exactly the same procedures as any other property owner. 2 ' Yet this seems to demean the religious nature of the claim-providing sanctuary-and reduces it, once again, to a matter of personal preference.
In both instances, the religious nature of the claim confounds the analysis. Courts devalue the religious nature of the claim when they privilege mainstream or "normal" religious claims.
29 At the same time, religious adherents must tame or sanitize their claim for it to be Kopel, The Religious Roots of the American Revolution and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 17 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL'Y 167 (2005) See, e.g., GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244 , 1255 (11th Cir. 2012 27. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) 4°T he trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on all counts. 4 ' The court found that the signage requirement burdened the religious beliefs and practices of the churches by requiring them to parrot a state-mandated message. 42 The trial court also found that the "parking lot" provision substantially burdened religion. 43 The state argued that church parking lots should not be given any special religious protection unless they were used as part of a religious celebration." The court found, however, that parking lots "are integral to [the church's] religious mission." 45 It would make little sense to allow churches to ban guns in the sanctuary but to 38. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16 ("Freedom of conscience; no preference to be given to any religious establishment or mode of worship. The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not deny or impair others retained by and inherent in the people. The right of every man to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any religious or ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent; nor shall any control of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state, nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious societies or religious or theological seminaries.").
39. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000) (holding that the First Amendment includes the right to not associate with others if doing so changes the message of the organization); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) Minnesota v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (1990) (stating that the Minnesota Constitution protects against incidental burdens on religion); Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 864-65 (Minn. 1992 [98:1103 to communicate their prohibition of guns and their request to remove the guns constituted a burden on their religion by forcing them to alter these fundamental beliefs. 5 6 The parking lot and tenant provisions caused similar burdens. 57 The court could find no compelling interest in subjecting the churches to the notice, the parking lot, or to the tenant requirement. 5 8 Minnesota law required that the state show that individualized religious exemptions would harm public safety. 59 Although the stated purpose of the law was to protect individual Second Amendment rights to keep and bear arms for self-defense, 6° the state did not provide any proof that churchgoers were being victimized in their parking lots. 61 The court also rejected the state's other asserted interests. 62 Because the court struck down the law under the state constitution, it did not reach the question of the law's constitutionality under the federal Free Exercise Clause. 63 At one time, federal free exercise claims were adjudicated using a compelling interest/narrowly tailored 56. . Church parking lots are used for funeral processions and other mission-related activities. Id. at 206-07. The state proposed a "functional" test that would allow the churches to ban guns when they used their parking lots for religious activities. Id. at 207. The court rejected this option because it would intrude the state even further into religions because the state would have to monitor the churches' activities on their parking lots to determine their religious nature. Id. The tenant provision denied the churches "the opportunity to limit the use of the actual church premises to tenants whose operations are consistent with the churches' commitment to nonviolence and their opposition to the carrying of guns. These are the same facilities where religious services are conducted. he state presented no evidence in the district court that denying an exemption to religious institutions would result in the victimization of citizens at church functions, in church parking lots, or in church building areas used by tenants. The state therefore did not show that religious practices, including the religious-based exclusion of weapons from church property and activities, are actually 'inconsistent with public safety."' (quoting Minnesota v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 398 (1990) ).
62. The state claimed that the parking lot provision of the law advanced the right to travel while the message provision ensured that citizens received clear and adequate information about their gun rights. Id. As for the former, the court noted that adequate onstreet parking was available. Id. As for the latter, the court noted that colleges and universities had considerable flexibility to communicate their policies relating to the possession of weapons on school property. [98:1103 test only for land-use regulations and burdens on institutionalized persons. 7°I n GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, several individuals, a gun rights organization, and a Baptist church challenged a Georgia law that prohibited the possession of weapons in a "place of worship. ' 71 The individual plaintiffs claimed that the law violated their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. 72 They argued that the law violated their rights by "prohibiting them from engaging in activities in a place of worship when those activities are generally permitted throughout the state. '73 Although the Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiffs had standing, 74 it concluded that they failed to state a free exercise challenge because they omitted any factual matter that pointed to a burden on a sincerely held religious belief. 75 The court noted that the First Amendment does not protect personal preferences or secular beliefs 76 and the plaintiffs failed to distinguish their personal preference to be armed from any religious duty to carry weapons: 71. GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1249 n.8 (11th Cir. 2012). The Georgia statute made it a misdemeanor to carry a "weapon or a long gun" in a place of worship. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(b) (2011 ( & Supp. 2013 We searched the Amended Complaint to no avail in an attempt to find factual allegations that could possibly be construed as alleging that the Carry Law imposes a constitutionally impermissible burden on one of Plaintiffs' sincerely held religious beliefs. At various points, Plaintiffs allege that they would like to carry a handgun in a place of worship for the protection either of themselves, their family, their flock, or other members of the Tabernacle. Plaintiffs conclude by alleging that the Carry Law interferes with their free exercise of religion by prohibiting them from engaging in activities in a place of worship when those activities are generally permitted throughout the State. That Plaintiffs "would like" to carry a firearm in order to be able to act in "self-defense" is a personal preference, motivated by a secular purpose. As we note supra, there is no First Amendment protection for personal preferences; nor is there protection for secular beliefs." 7
The plaintiffs argued that they did not have to show a burden when a law was not neutral. 7 8 They asserted that the law could not be neutral as to religion if it specifically set houses of worship apart from other secular property, but according to the court, this mischaracterized existing Free Exercise Clause precedent. 9 A free exercise complaint will be dismissed if it "does not allege that (1) the plaintiff holds a belief, not a preference, that is sincerely held and religious in nature, not merely secular; and (2) the law at issue in some way impacts the plaintiff's ability to either hold that belief or act pursuant to that belief." 8 0
Litigants like the ones in GeorgiaCarry.org will have trouble articulating their claim in religious terms. What exactly is the nature of the claim? Is it to be armed in general or is it to be armed in church? Is there a symbolic meaning to carrying weapons in general or specifically into a place of worship? It may have a basis in a deeply felt cultural or social imperative, but unless they can point to some theological basis or religious practice to explain how a ban on gun possession interferes with their religious practice, neither the Free Exercise Clause nor federal law will come into play. 81 This is where the Georgia plaintiffs foundered. They are undoubtedly correct that the law set religion apart, but they fail the threshold question of whether or not a law burdens a religious practice. In any event, the Eleventh Circuit seemed skeptical of their claim.
82
On the other hand, the Minnesota court had no difficulty finding a religious burden. 83 Indeed, the state did not challenge the religious claim and the existence of a burden seemed almost self-evident to the court.' Yet deciding what is a religious burden is difficult task that is not supposed to turn on the court's "perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection." 85 "Courts should not ... dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is 'struggling' with his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might employ.
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF SIKHS AND KIRPANS
While the Baptist plaintiffs in GeorgiaCarry.org had trouble connecting weapon possession to religious beliefs, Sikhs can make that claim easily. Their problem, however, is that it must be sanitized and tamed to receive protection. Sikh men are required to have in their possession five items, one of which is a curved dagger or sword. 87 Here the religious adherent can persuasively argue that the possession of the weapon is itself a religious practice. 88 A Sikh man can easily show that a weapon ban substantially burdens his religious practice. The fit between the state's means and ends becomes the most critical part of the analysis.
82. See id. at 1255 ("Plaintiffs allege that the Carry Law 'interferes with the free exercise of religion by Plaintiffs by prohibiting them from engaging in activities in a place of worship when those activities are generally permitted throughout the state.' This so-called prohibition applies to anyone who enters a place of worship-regardless of the person's religious preference." (citation omitted)). This seems to conflate the question of religious burden with the question of the law's neutrality. There was no question that the ban burdened a sincerely held religious belief. 95 Unlike the Baptist plaintiffs in Georgia, the Sikh children could point to a centuries-old, well-articulated tradition requiring the possession of the kirpan. 96 had a compelling interest in campus safety, the court held that there were less restrictive alternatives to a total ban:
But we simply could not conclude that nothing short of a wholesale ban would adequately protect student safety. The problem was a total failure of proof; the school district refused to produce any evidence whatever to demonstrate the lack of a less restrictive alternative. 9 7
The court noted that other school districts had successfully accommodated Sikh children without sacrificing student safety. 98 The court upheld the lower court's injunction that allowed kirpan possession in schools under the following conditions: that the kirpan have a dull blade, is about three and one-half inches in length, and is sewn into its sheath and worn under clothing. 99 These policies apparently were aimed at making the kirpan unavailable for use by either literally blunting it or making it inaccessible. The dissent argued that this accommodation did not serve the district's interest in safety. 10 The knives are unquestionably dangerous. Even when sewn to their sheaths, they can still be removed.' 0 ' 97. Cheema, 67 F.3d at 885. Cheema was decided prior to City of Boerne v. Flores, where the Supreme Court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, at least as it applied to actions by state and local governments. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) . RFRA required that state and local government actions that substantially burden a sincerely held religious belief must be the least restrictive way to advance a compelling state interest. Cheema, 67 F.3d at 888 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). Today, because the weapons ban is facially neutral as to religion and generally applicable to all students, the school district would probably only have to show that the weapons ban was reasonably related to a legitimate state interest in order to survive a free exercise challenge. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) . Nevertheless, the case illustrates the recurring problems with religious freedom claims and the shifting nature of neutrality. 98. Cheema, 67 F.3d at 885 n.3. 99. Id. at 886. 100. Id. at 890-91 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) ("The district court was presented with an affidavit from a school secretary who was able to observe Jaspreet Cheema's (supposedly unnoticeable) kirpan. Worse still, she observed that Jaspreet's 4 year-old brother was wearing one, too. And, most alarmingly, the secretary stated that Jaspreet told her that 'if anybody steals from me, I can put this to them.' While making this statement, he grabbed his kirpan.").
101. Id. at 891.
Moreover, there was no evidence that the children in question were any more mature than other children their age and, therefore, should not have knives available to them during the school day."°W hat was more intriguing about the dissent, however, was its direct analysis of the nature of the actual religious belief at issue. Kirpans symbolize a Sikh's desire to do "God's Justice.' '1 3 Expert testimony at trial indicated that the weapon was not simply symbolic."
Indeed, a useless weapon would not serve its religious purpose. Sikhs must carry a kirpan so that is can be used to defend their religion."°5 According to plaintiff's expert, only real, functional knives could satisfy the religious duty to carry the weapon. 0 6 Neither carrying a symbolic kirpan nor riveting it into its sheath would satisfy the religious duty to be armed. 7 Those changes "would alter it and destroy its character as a kirpan. A kirpan is a knife, not a knife and sheath combination." 10 8
The dissent looked at the knife objectively and not through the subjective, religious lens of the Sikh believer. 0 9 If the kirpan is a knife, then the school district has the right to ban its possession regardless of its religious significance to Sikh believers. 10 Viewed from this perspective, the proposed accommodations were incoherent and ineffective. The injunction allowed the children to carry the weapon if it was sewn into the sheath and worn under the clothing. 1 ' But as the plaintiff's expert pointed out, this did not render the knife 102. The dissent pointed out at least two instances where the children had taken their knives out of their sheaths. Id. In one instance, they were trying to cut the rope on the flag pole. Id. In a similar vein, a teacher claimed that she saw the Sikh children attempting to hoist a kirpan up the flag pole. inaccessible. 112 The lower court and the plaintiffs seemed to suggest that the kirpan was somehow not a knife, but as the dissent pointed out, this conclusion was belied by the plaintiff's own experts."' Common sense and religious belief both point to one conclusion: A knife is a knife.
When combined with another required item -the kara -the conclusion is inescapable: the kirpan is a weapon whose religious significance lies in its availability to be used in defense of the faith." 4 The district court relied on the accommodations that other school districts had in place to find that a total ban violated RFRA. 15 But, as the dissent pointed out, those districts took more assertive measures to ensure that the kirpan was rendered unusable." 6 If the dissent was correct, these other policies did not support the more expansive policy approved by the district court.
Moreover, they also point out the intractability of religious accommodations in this circumstance.
The other school districts essentially changed the nature of the kirpan from an actual weapon 112. See id. at 890-91 (Wiggins, J., dissenting). 113. Id. 114. See id. at 890. The dissent argued that the actual religious belief and practice required that the kirpan be a real weapon capable of use in defense of the faith. Id. The dissent pointed to the affidavit of the plaintiff's expert who, "although unintentionally, revealed that even through the eyes of a Sikh, a kirpan is indeed a weapon." Id. While the expert stated that a kirpan "'would never be regarded [as a weapon] by a Khalsa Sikh,' he referred to the kirpan as 'sword' and a 'knife." ' Id. (alteration in original) . "He explained that '[a] kirpan must be made of steel and have a curved blade. It is not particularly sharp, although it is an actual knife or dagger." ' Id. (alteration in original) . The expert "explained that another requirement of Khalsa Sikhs is that they wear a steel bracelet, called a kara, at all times, 'to remind that the sword [kirpan] is to be used only in self defense and the propagation of justice." ' Id. ( [t]wo of the three "examples of accommodation" to which the majority referred involved school districts that only allowed kirpans if the two restrictions the District forwarded in the present case were followed. Both Yuba City and Live Oak Unified School Districts only allow kirpans that are no longer than 3 inches in total length, and even those must be riveted to their sheaths. The third school district to which the majority referred has different restrictions (a rounded tip and a blunted edge), that accomplish the same thing: the kirpan is rendered a non-functional knife.
available for defensive use to a mere symbol. 117 It made it so that the kirpan could no longer serve its actual religious purpose. In Cheema, the Sikh plaintiffs even argued that the kirpan was not really a knife or a weapon. 18 The Sikh claim and the dissent's skepticism illustrate the inherent tension in religious freedom law. Most religious claims are subjective. That is, they rely on faith in an unseen reality or symbolic actions that express a religious truth." 9 Their religious significance disappears when that lens is removed and they are viewed "objectively.' 20 The other school district's accommodations were typical of the way that minority religions must dilute their beliefs to gain accommodation or 117. See Waldron, supra note 114, at 7 (" [T] here is something patronizing in the view that the kirpan is carried by the Sikh initiate purely as a matter of religious observance, as though its ceremonial significance had nothing to do with its significance as a weapon.").
118. http://www.usccb.org/prayer-and-w orship/the-mass/order-of-mass/liturgy-of-the-eucharist/the-rea-presence-of-jesus-christ-in-the -sacrament-of-the-eucharist-basic-questions-and-answers.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) , archived at http://perma.cc/WKY2-FPG8. Objectively, the host is a wafer of unleavened bread, but the believer does not treat it as such. Rather, the belief in the Real Presence compels believers to act reverently toward the host and to take steps to prevent its misuse or destruction. Id. But seen from the dissent's perspective, the host remains a dry wafer and that is how the law should see it.
acceptance.
121 Indeed, the policy in the reported decision illustrates this, too. The school district's accommodations suggested that they believed they had "neutralized" the knives' danger without also recognizing that truly doing so emptied the practice of religious significance.
Brian Leiter uses the kirpan example as a central feature of his position that religious practices should not be given special constitutional exemptions from general laws.
2
Leiter posits two hypothetical boys: one boy, a Sikh who carries a knife to fulfill a religious obligation, and the other boy, a young man in a rural community who is given a knife as a cultural rite of passage to manhood. 23 Leiter is puzzled by the different treatment these boys would receive if they sought to bring their knives to school:
There is no Western democracy, at present, in which the [rural] boy.., has prevailed or would prevail in a challenge to a general prohibition on the carrying of weapons in the school. Were he a Sikh he would stand a good chance of winning. But if he can only appeal to a century-old tradition, central to his identity, to which he feels categorically bound by his family traditions and upbringing, he is out of luck. 24 Leiter notes that the Multani decision upheld the right of the Sikh children to wear real knives if they held a sincere personal and religious belief in its importance .
12
The court noted the unique characteristics of schools that distinguished them from places like courthouses and airports, where the kirpan could be banned. 26 Yet, as Leiter points out, the court failed to consider those circumstances in which schools may be uniquely vulnerable to violence from weapons carried on students' Leiter's principle suggests a different approach in the GeorgiaCarry.org and Edina cases. Not only can the plaintiffs rely on a sustained and sincere tradition (especially in the south), they have also built their claim on a religious foundation.' 32 The right (if not the duty) of self-defense is well established in Christian theology. 13 3 Granting them an exemption from the gun law would not shift the burden to anyone else. Unlike children who are compelled to be in school, no adult is forced to attend any particular church. ' Churchgoers who object to fellow members being armed are free to find a church with beliefs and practices more compatible with their own.
Even if the right is not religious in nature, it points out how problematic it is for courts to distinguish religious beliefs from convictions of conscience. In Georgia Carry.org, the church's desire to be armed for self-defense grew out of not only a long tradition but also a shooting in a nearby church. 135 Their desire could be a religious belief or a conviction of conscience, deeply and sincerely held, as well as a secular preference for safety. Leiter is skeptical that religious claims should be 127. LEITER, supra note 90, at 65-66 (noting the general lack of armed guards, the immaturity of the students, and the natural and inevitable "antagonistic relationships" among students and between faculty and students).
128. Id. at 66.
See id. at 66-67 ("[T]
here is no principled reason for legal or constitutional regimes to single out religion for protection.").
130. Id. at 4. 131. Id.; see also HAMILTON, supra note 109, at 116 (criticizing the Cheema majority for "thinking only in terms of the needs of the believer").
132. I will assume its sincerity for the moment.
133. See infra Part V.
134. Of course, children are present during a worship service, but they are typically in a room surrounded by adults, the exact opposite of the makeup of elementary and secondary schools.
135. See Whitman, supra note 12, at 1988-89.
given special exemptions when secular claims of conscience will not.
1 36
In the end, Leiter's counsel is to limit the reach of religious exemptions because a principled application of a broad exemption for conscience would include so many claims that it "would appear to amount to a legalization of anarchy.,
137
On the other hand, the Edina churches' claims for exemptions from the signage and request requirements set religion apart from every other private establishment.
1 38 The law imposed little additional burden on the religious establishment that other private establishments did not share. Rather, their religious claim allowed them to be set apart from a law that everyone else had to follow. Per Leiter, there is no principled way to justify this exception, especially when the burden on religious practice is almost non-existent. 39 When it comes to possession of a kirpan, however, the more precise the believer articulates his belief, the less likely he is to gain protection. The Sikh plaintiffs in Cheema and their fellow Sikhs in the other schools mentioned in the opinion had to water down the significance of the kirpan in order to carry it in schools. 40 If they had claimed that the religious significance of the kirpan was that it be available for use in selfdefense, they would have lost their case. Religious gun owners face a similar challenge. Unlike the Sikh's, the Georgia Carry.org plaintiffs could not articulate a clear theological or historical justification for gun possession in church.
141
Rather, as the Eleventh Circuit pointed out, they were left asserting what sounded like a personal preference. 42 There is a religious argument for gun possession, but articulating it will drag courts into evaluating the reasonableness of the religious belief, a place where courts do not want to go. 680, 699 (1989) (arguing that the judiciary is not competent to determine centrality of religious belief or practice); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714-16 (1981) (stating that the judiciary should not ask whether a claimant's religious understanding is correct).
V. IS THERE A RELIGIOUS DUTY OF SELF DEFENSE?
David Kopel argues for a religious duty of self-defense, a duty that presumably prevents states from prohibiting gun possession. 1 He accurately, if tendentiously, 45 relates the history of the traditional Christian reliance on the just war theory. 14 He argues that Western Christianity's recent emphasis on "pacifism" is a departure from traditional doctrine. 14 7
He concludes that, at least in the Roman Catholic tradition, "states and families" have a religious duty of selfdefense. 4 He relies on Vatican documents that discuss this duty in the context of governments intervening in other states to prevent abuses of human rights.' 4 9 Indeed, these very documents approve gun control measures for individuals.' 0 Kopel agrees with the documents until this point where he interposes secular constitutional rights to bear arms to refute the Vatican's conclusion.' 5 ' Kopel conflates the duty of civil authorities to defend their people with the duty of individuals to be armed.' 52 One can agree that an individual may act in self-defense without also concluding that that individual must be armed at all times.
At the same time, Kopel correctly points out that mainstream religions have always approved of the use of force in some circumstances, not the least of which was for individual self-defense.' 53 To that extent, churches like those in the Edina case have weaker religious claims than the plaintiffs in Georgia Carry. org. This is a disagreement among Christians about the interpretation of Scripture and Tradition, the authority of institutional interpretation as opposed to individual interpretation, and the relative importance of one over the other. 5 4 In other words, these are religious disputes. To resolve them, one must engage the materials and come to a religious conclusion. The 144. Kopel, Evolving Attitudes, supra note 20, at 1764-65 ("[Airmed defense was a "right" and a "duty" fQr families and for nations.").
145. 
VI. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ISSUES IN CATEGORICAL AND OPT-OUT

JURISDICTIONS
In categorical jurisdictions, places of worship feel singled out because the law specifically excludes religious property. 55 State laws that categorically prohibit the possession of guns in churches are not neutral as to religion. That is, unlike laws that treat churches the same as any other private property owner, categorical exclusions carved out a special exception for churches.
Other pieces of property are also categorically excluded. Often statutes will prohibit possession of guns not only in churches but also in schools, government buildings, and other places where large groups may gather.' 56 This suggests that there are non-religious reasons for prohibiting gun possession in churches. The state may argue health and safety, ease of enforcement, or other similar arguments. 57 Churches will claim, however, that they are singled out because they vary so widely in their size, location, and practice.' 58 That is, the other places categorically excluded all have similar features. For example, schools will not vary largely in size. They will all contain minors or vulnerable individuals, and they all house people for considerable periods of the day. Churches, on the other hand, range in size from the mega church to the living room church. Moreover, these churches will have vastly different missions and vastly different practices. For some, it would be unthinkable to allow their members to be armed." 9 But for others the question may be much closer." 6 Thus, they argue that the categorical exclusion of churches is not neutral as to religion because it privileges one particular theology about weapons and peace.
In opt-out jurisdictions, however, gun laws are neutral as to religion. For example, the Minnesota concealed carry law does not single out 155. See, e.g., GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244 , 1255 (11th Cir. 2012 churches. 162 Rather, it includes churches in the general description of private establishments and imposes on them the same duties and responsibilities as other private establishments. 163 Thus, the law is neutral because it simply requires churches who object to the presence of guns on their property to follow the same steps as other private establishments. Here the problem for the church is getting past the neutrality and general applicability threshold. That is, the church can show a real burden to its religious belief and practice, but a court will never get to that question under the federal Constitution unless the church can show the law's lack of neutrality. 1 64 Pro-gun churches will not be able to show any religious significance to their beliefs, while anti-gun churches will not be able to show that the laws are targeted at religion. The pro-gun churches will have to allege a "theology of gun possession" that may be manufactured only for the litigation. Courts would have to examine the theological basis of the pro-gun claim in order to determine whether or not the law burdens religion. 165 Perhaps that is why courts easily glide over the burden issue to rule on other facets of the analysis, 166 but ignoring the burden question in these gun cases is impossible. The Minnesota courts were seemingly persuaded by theological and religious claims of the plaintiffs. 16 7 That may also be true for the Eleventh Circuit's decision. It created a distinction between "personal preferences" and "religious beliefs."' 6 8 Apparently, the plaintiff churches in that case could not frame their arguments in terms religious enough to satisfy the court. 16 GeorgiaCarry.org, the court could find no justification for the claim that the law burdened any religious beliefs.' 79 The plaintiffs in Edina received a more sympathetic reception. The court simply asserted that there was no doubt that the law burdened the plaintiffs' religion, and the at 251 (non-Christian religions never win at the Supreme Court level); see also Feldman, Christian America, supra note 121, at 273 n.5 (arguing that potential non-Christian religion free exercise victories are "ambiguous"). 176. See Feldman, Religious Minorities, supra note 19, at 252 ("America is a predominantly Christian nation. It therefore is not unreasonable to suppose that Christians should receive preferential treatment at the hands of the Court. Christians probably are less likely to find that the exercise of their religion is burdened by laws in the first place. Because of the majoritarian process, lawmakers are less likely to adopt laws that place burdens on adherents of Christianity, the majority religion. If, however, Christians do find themselves in court defending the exercise of their religion, the judiciary is likely to be receptive to their claims. Primarily, this is because Christian judges should be more likely to be sympathetic to the plight of fellow Christians. The religious burden may appear more 'substantial,' or the governmental interests may seem less 'compelling' when they burden Christians than when they burden non-Christians. Therefore, mainstream Christians should prevail more often than non-Christians in free exercise cases." (quoting Brent, supra note 174, at 248)).
177. Id. at 249. 178. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221,225, 235 (1972) 179. GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244 , 1258 (11th Cir. 2012 .
state conceded the sincerity of the belief. 18° It is not self-evident, however, what the burden actually was. The plaintiffs objected to two requirements: that they put up a sign with state-mandated wording to put people on notice of their no-gun policy and that they allow permit holders to have their guns on church parking lots.' 81 The churches noted their commitment to peace and nonviolence, but there was nothing in either regulation that interfered with these beliefs.' 82 Indeed, there was little in the law that interfered with their practices either. 183 The churches' prohibition on weapons continued unabated whether they were categorically exempt or if they posted notice.' 84 Minnesota's law accommodated the rights of private establishments, a category that surely includes places of worship. 185 Declaring that guns were forbidden was an accurate statement of their religious beliefs, 186 and by doing so, the law allowed them to continue their practices. Similarly, the parking lot provision could only plausibly constitute a burden in those few times when the lot was used for religious practice. 8 7 Even then, the guns would remain in vehicles and not be on any participant. Moreover, as the court noted, public, onand off-street parking was readily available.' 88 It would not be much more difficult for a person to gain access to a weapon in nearby onstreet parking as it would be in the church parking lot.
The ease with which the court found this burden is consistent with the way courts treat claims by mainstream religions. 89 Non-violence seems like a "natural" religious position. 1 90 The presence of weapons, even in locked cars, suggests the possibility of violence. Therefore, it 180. Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 203-208 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008 was "obvious" that the law burdened religion. The GeorgiaCarry.org plaintiffs had to fight this perception. They wanted their parishioners to be armed for their and the congregation's protection, 9 ' but this runs directly counter to the "natural" perception that religion and places of worship are refuges from violence." 9 Yet places of worship are victimized by violence.' 9 3 Most faiths have developed theological justifications for the use of violence in certain circumstances. 194 Thus, far from being in the mainstream, pacifism may be the exception for 195. See, e.g., Kopel, Religious Roots, supra note 20 (religious sentiment at the founding saw self-defense as a sacred duty). This does not contradict the claim that non-mainstream religions find it difficult to win free exercise cases. See Feldman, Christian America, supra note 121. This is not a theological or analytical process. That is, courts do not investigate the theological or historical background of the claims in front of them. Rather, they operate based on social and cultural assumptions about what is "normal" or "natural." That Western religions might justify the use of force is not at the forefront of the judicial mind. Rather, the non-violence claims fall within a contemporary narrative of peaceful religion while the possession of weapons falls outside that narrative. practice may be asking too much of them. Judges are subject to the same cognitive, cultural and social biases as everyone else."i "Religion" powerfully frames the issue and activates deep cognitive processes. As Professor Krotoszynski notes, The very notion of "religion" triggers deep-seated, largely unconscious cultural associations and understandings. To ask someone to characterize a particular group as a "religion" requires her to draw a material equivalency between the beliefs of the group in question and her own beliefs; if the equivalency seems unwarranted because of the bizarre nature of the group's theology, she might well prove unwilling to accept that the other group is a legitimate "religion" in the same way as her own. "The attitude that most affects social and political behavior is prejudice against people who are different. 198 When faced with ideas or behavior at odds with our own, cognitive dissonance results. 199 We reduce that dissonance by removing the disagreeable idea or behavior."° Because there is no legal definition of religion for free exercise purposes, a judge must subconsciously evaluate the authenticity of the claim and the claimant. 201 An individual confronted with a religious belief that she views as unusual or bizarre may cause her to discount that belief and reaffirm her own. 20 2 Judges who must decide if a neutral law burdens an "unusual or bizarre" belief will likely employ cognitively similar tactics. The result is that non-mainstream religions bring more and lose more free exercise cases than mainstream religions. 2°5 The very nature of religious claims makes them difficult to translate into contemporary legal categories. 2°6 The translation process sanitizes them or leaves them impossible to understand by a "rational" and "objective" analysis. 0 7 In a world that has long since declared God's death, claims of religious truth and obligation fail to resonate.
2 0 8 As Professor Paulsen argues, true religious claims are different from other obligations, however deeply felt.
The nature of religious obligation is intrinsically different from philosophical or moral belief systems that involve no conception of a transcendent Creator, God. The believer understands himself to be under the superior authority of God. The ethical humanist, secularist, or atheist does not; he does not believe in God. Rather, he is subject to the moral commands he discerns for himself. (In a very real sense, the atheist is "God" for himself, the only ultimate authority over his own conscience. He really is, in Smith's words, "a law unto himself.") 2 9
Religion not only assumes a command superior to the state's, it also plays a central role in one's identity. 1 0 Perhaps, then, the only burdens the Free Exercise Clause should care about are those that leave the individual with a stark choice: violate the law or violate your religion. Courts should only protect those infringements that go to the heart of one's religious practice and identity: where following one's secular obligations is not merely inconvenient but fundamentally inconsistent with one's religious principles. Preventing Sikh children from taking their kirpan into schools is such a choice. 2 t 1 It is not clear that preventing Baptists from taking their guns into their church service is the same thing. 2 12 Yet such a harsh standard would involve the courts even more deeply in purely religious questions, 213 carve out a huge space for government to occupy in the lives of citizens,214 and ultimately devalue the role of religious belief in an individual's life. 215 
B. The Exemption Problem
Second, these cases are part of the larger debate about how easy it should be to get religious exemptions from general laws. 16 Too easy 212. See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 90, 1-3 (comparing a rural boy who receives a pocket knife as a rite of passage and the Sikh boy who carries the kirpan as part of his religious identity).
213. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87 (stating that courts must not determine the importance or the plausibility of religious claims); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (noting that centrality of religious belief not for judiciary to decide); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193, 194 (2000) (stating that equality serves as a "center of gravity, assuring that the constitutional status of religion does not veer too far in any one direction").
215. See Laycock, Religious Exemption, supra note 69, at 176 (noting that without exemptions the right to believe is "hollow"). 22 Judicially crafted exemptions through the Free Exercise Clause allow courts, which are not equipped to deal with weighing of complex social and cultural factors, to pick and choose social and political winners and losers. 221 Exemptions should only be given by legislatures on a case-by-case basis when no significant harm to others will result.
Exempting religious conduct from neutral, general laws must be (1) duly enacted by a legislature, not decreed by a court; (2) must be debated under the harsh glare of public scrutiny; and (3) must be consistent with the larger public good. Where the burden on religious conduct can be lifted by the legislature with only de minimis harm to the public, there is good reason to accommodate the religious conduct. 222 Laycock critiques this position in a no-holds-barred book review. 223 He calls it a "dreadful book" and most of it a "poorly executed rant -(suggesting that broad exemptions may undermine state's interest in equality and in protecting children).
217. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (suggesting that broad exemptions would be "courting anarchy"); LEITER, supra note 90, at 94 (noting that broad exemptions could be something like "anarchy"); see also, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014 (involving a for-profit company that objected to four of twenty contraceptive methods required to be included in health insurance plan).
218. Laycock, Religious Exemption, supra note 69, at 176 ("Regulatory exemptions are an essential part of meaningful religious liberty. The right to believe a religion is hollow without the right to practice the religion; it leaves committed believers subject to persecution for exercising their religion.").
219. Hamilton's calculus leads her to the conclusion that broad religious exemptions cause more harm than good. Compare HAMILTON, supra note 109, at 3 ("The purpose of this book is to persuade Americans to take off the rose-colored glasses and to come to terms with the necessity of making religious individuals and institutions accountable to the law so that they do not harm others."), with Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty As Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 314, 353 (1996) [hereinafter Laycock, Religious Liberty] ("Religious liberty does not view religion as a good thing to be promoted, nor as a dangerous force to be contained. But people who view religion in each of these ways struggle to capture the Religion Clauses for their side.").
230. HAMILTON, supra note 109, at 8 (stating that exemptions should only be granted when "immunizing religious conduct is consistent with public welfare, health, and safety").
C. The Neutrality Problem
Third, the gun cases relate to what it means to be "neutral" as to religion. Courts use neutrality as the talisman of religion clause jurisprudence without explaining what being neutral really means. 237 Douglas Laycock has argued that instead of a single concept called "neutrality," there are three different ways that laws can be neutral as to religion. 238 He distinguishes between formal neutrality, substantive neutrality, and disaggregated neutrality. 2 39 Formal neutrality requires the government to use neutral categories. 24° Substantive neutrality requires the government to use neutral incentives. 2 1 Laycock uses the example of a ban on children drinking alcohol. 2 42 The ban is formally neutral because it does not use religion as a defining category. 243 Like the statutes in the opt-out jurisdictions, it applies to everyone regardless of religious or secular status. 244 But it would be proper for states to make exceptions for such practices (or, at least, look the other way):
[A]n exception that permits children to take communion wine is substantively neutral. Exempting communion wine from the ban on under-age consumption of alcohol is extraordinarily unlikely to induce anyone to become a Christian, to join a denomination that uses real wine in its communion service, or to attend communion services more often -unless that person already desired to do these things but had been deterred by the threat of government-imposed penalties. Consuming communion wine is a desirable activity only to those who already believe in the religious teaching that gives meaning to the act. Forbidding children to take communion wine, or criminally punishing their parents and the priest who gives them the sacrament, powerfully discourages an act of worship. But exemption does not encourage any child to take communion, or any parent to take his child to a communion service, who is not already religiously motivated do so. An exemption does not change anyone's religious incentives; criminalization changes those incentives profoundly.
245
Categorical jurisdictions explicitly use religion to set houses of worship apart from most private property owners. 246 Apparently, houses of worship are thought to be like other public or government buildings. If so, then these laws are formally neutral because "religious and secular examples of the same phenomenon" are treated alike. 247 On the surface, that appears true. On closer inspection, however, this exclusion seems to flow from assumptions about the naturalness or reasonableness of religious claims. 48 At the same time, opt-out jurisdictions are substantively neutral because they allow property owners, including houses of worship, to exclude guns from their property upon compliance with the statutory 244. See Laycock, Substantive Neutrality, supra note 237, at 55 ("[F] orbidding children to take communion wine is formally neutral. Children cannot consume alcoholic beverages in any amount for any purpose. Religion is not a category in the formulation or application of this rule; alcohol is forbidden to children whether for religious purposes or secular purposes."); supra note 14.
245 Perhaps searching for neutrality is a fool's errand. As Steven Smith noted,
[T]he quest for neutrality, despite its understandable appeal and the tenacity with which it has been pursued, is an attempt to grasp at an illusion. Upon reflection, this failure should not be surprising. The impossibility of a truly "neutral" theory of religious freedom is analogous to the impossibility, recognized by modern philosophers, of finding some outside Archimedean point ... from which to look down on and describe reality. Descriptions of reality are always undertaken from a point within reality. In the same way, theories of religious freedom are always offered from the viewpoint of one of the competing positions that generate the need for such a theory; there is no neutral vantage point that can permit the theorist or judge to transcend these competing positions. 3
The gun cases show how difficult it is to find a "neutral" vantage point from which to view religion cases. The result is that courts will avoid the actual right at issue and rely on background assumptions about religion and neutrality. 4 The Free Exercise Clause, perhaps like the Free Speech Clause, allows the individual to forge a personal identity free from government compulsion. 26 Under this Supreme Court's shift to formal neutrality has shifted religion clause doctrine from protecting minority religions to preserving majority religions' political and social dominance are not components of some philosophy of the "secular public realm" but meetings of "fellow citizens with the saints, and of the household of God" seeking salvation through Jesus Christ the Son of God. In short, the current arguments generally offered in favor of religious liberty have nothing to do with the ultimate concerns that are at the heart of religious belief. They simply do not take such concerns seriously.
63
Under this reading, the Framers were not agnostic (in either sense) about the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause. They wanted to protect religion." As Michael Stokes Paulsen puts it:
The Free Exercise Clause only makes sense on the assumption that God exists; that God makes claims on the loyalty of human beings; and that these claims are prior to and superior in obligation to the claims of the State. The Clause thus embodies an essentially religious premise. 265 The Framers intended to create legal equality among all religions and protect those actions that flowed from a religious premise. 66 To do otherwise renders the religion clauses incoherent because it ends up protecting purely secular behavior:
If the Free Exercise Clause ... confer[s] a sphere of immunity from facially neutral government regulation, then the "exercise" of atheism, agnosticism, skepticism, rationalism, humanism, and secularism indeed confers a huge area of exemption from government laws. And it is a zone of exemption having, really, nothing much to do with religion. It is secular freedomautonomy in general-treated as on par with religion, because it is religion's complement, secular analog, or even opposite.
7
Members of each camp sometimes reach the same conclusion about how strong the Free Exercise Clause should be. 2 268. Compare Paulsen, God Is Great, supra note 265, at 1610 ("Accordingly, the Free Exercise Clause confers an area of substantive immunity from government regulation that interferes with religious belief and exercise. We prefer the sincere individual's claim of religious conscience to the government's claim of secular authority, absent an extraordinary showing of insincere religion or of a threat to state interests of the highest order."), with Laycock, Religious Exemptions, supra note 69, at 176 ("Regulatory exemptions are an essential part of meaningful religious liberty. The right to believe a religion is hollow without the right to practice the religion; it leaves committed believers subject to persecution for exercising their religion.").
prior and greater obligation than those of the state -we should protect only those religions whose beliefs and commands we understand to fall within the acceptable range of having a plausible claim to be True Beliefs. In fact, however, we protect much more, including a considerable amount of what even religious people view as religious rubbish. We do so because we do not trust political majorities, and we certainly do not trust government agents, to distinguish Truth from Rubbish and because it is exceedingly difficult (and dangerous) to try to draft a religious freedom rule that successfully draws such a line. In short, we protect the core freedom because we believe it consists of something objectively important and true, and we adopt an overbroad prophylactic rule for the sake of protecting the core freedom. At least, that was probably the original purpose of protecting religious freedom.
69
These conceptual issues merge in weapons cases. Courts must decide whether or not a substantial burden on religion exists. To get there, they must resolve the background questions of the Free Exercise Clause's purpose and what should count as a "religious burden."" 27 That they do so silently and unwittingly speaks volumes about the incoherency of contemporary free exercise law.
These seemingly minor cases reveal how muddy and opaque free exercise law is. 271 Courts decide cases without a clear conceptual or historical framework. They silently measure the claim by the degree to which the claim seems compatible with their own experience, thus making free exercise law a reflection of their conceptions, fears, and assumptions about religion. It is, as it were, that courts only "see through a glass, darkly. ' '2 72 We await the day when they can see directly. 272. 1 Corinthians 13:12 (King James). Paul described how difficult it is for human beings to comprehend things that could not be directly grasped by our current experience which the King James version poetically and beautifully translated as "through a glass, darkly." Id. This notion is expressed more directly in some modern translations. See, e.g., 1 Corinthians 13:12 (New Living) ("Now we see things imperfectly as in a poor mirror."). Other translations are available at Compare Translations for 1 Corinthians 13:12, BIBLE STUDY TOOLS (last visited Mar. 27, 2015) , http://www.biblestudytools.com/1-corinthians/13-12-compare.html, archived at http://perma.cc/AH4V-236R.
